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of Populism 
Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards 
Latin America’s economic history seems to repeat itself endlessly, following 
irregular and dramatic cycles. This sense of circularity is particularly striking 
with respect to the use of  populist macroeconomic policies for distributive 
purposes. Again and again, and in country after country, policymakers have 
embraced economic programs that rely heavily on the use of expansive fiscal 
and credit policies and overvalued currency to accelerate growth and redistrib- 
ute income. In implementing these policies, there has usually been no concern 
for the existence of fiscal and foreign exchange constraints. After a short pe- 
riod of economic growth and recovery, bottlenecks develop provoking unsus- 
tainable macroeconomic pressures that, at the end, result in the plummeting 
of real wages and severe balance of payment difficulties. The final outcome of 
these experiments has generally been galloping inflation, crisis, and the col- 
lapse of the economic system. In the aftermath of these experiments there is 
no other alternative left but to implement, typically with the help of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF), a drastically restrictive and costly stabiliza- 
tion program. The self-destructive feature of populism is particularly apparent 
from the stark decline in per capita income and real wages in the final days of 
these experiences. 
Accounts of these populist episodes by  sympathizers often highlight poli- 
tics and, especially, external factors as central to the demise. We  do not pre- 
tend to belittle these factors. There is no question in our minds that external 
destabilization can be an important part of the unraveling of an economic pro- 
gram.  But we  want to emphasize that the extreme vulnerability that makes 
destabilization possible is, by  and large, the result of unsustainable policies. 
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stitute of Technology and a research associate of the National  Bureau of Economic Research. 
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This is one more reason to focus sharply on the macroeconomics of populist 
programs. 
How can we explain this recurrence of mistakes and ill-conceived develop- 
ment strategies that span so many countries at different points in time? Is it 
just the lack of “memory” of policymakers,  or is it, perhaps, a deeply rooted 
ignorance of the mechanics of economic populism? An alternative interpreta- 
tion,  based  on the  new  political  economy  approach  to  economic  policy- 
making, is  that the engineers of  these populist episodes have some kind of 
(dynamic) strategic considerations in mind. 
Our purpose in organizing this conference was to bring together a group of 
experts on Latin America to analyze general systemic features of macroeco- 
nomic populism  in Latin America and to document the regularities,  and pe- 
culiarities, of a large number of populist episodes. The case studies collected 
in this volume show the striking similarity of populist policies in a score of 
Latin American countries. Policymakers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Peru, and Nicaragua  had  comparable  views on the objective conditions  of 
their economies, on how  they proposed  that strongly expansionary policies 
should and could be carried out, and how they rationalized that constraints 
could be dealt with. More impressive perhaps, is the fact, so clearly illustrated 
throughout the volume, that in the end, foreign exchange constraints and ex- 
treme inflation forced, in every country, a program of violent real wage cuts 
that ended, in many instances, in massive political instability, coups, and vio- 
lence. There is no doubt in our minds about the sincerity of  the policymakers 
who embarked on these  programs,  and we  share their concern  for income 
distribution and poverty alleviation. It is, however, the very sincerity of these 
policymakers that makes the necessity of laying out exactly how and why the 
programs go wrong particularly urgent. 
In this  first chapter we present  what  we consider to be the most  salient 
features of the populist paradigm, and we discuss the circumstances that lead 
policymakers to repeatedly undertake these type of policies in spite of abun- 
dant historical evidence on their harmful consequences. I  Our emphasis is on 
the macroeconomics  of populism, not because we think that other aspects of 
the phenomenon  are uninteresting,  but because  we believe  that  it is in the 
macroeconomic sphere that populist experiences have been particularly weak. 
An earlier version of  this paper was distributed to the different participants in 
this project and was used by most of them as a general framework in preparing 
their own contributions  to the conference.  In that regard, then,  this chapter 
provides a somewhat unifying framework used by the majority of the authors. 
1.1  The Populist Paradigm 
Populism is, in many ways, a controversial concept. In fact, for many years 
political scientists have struggled to provide a meaningful and precise defini- 
I. Parts of this chapter draw on our paper on the populist experiences of Peru and Chile. See 
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tion. Drake (1982j, for example, has emphasized three elements of a tentative 
definition: populism uses “political mobilization, recurrent rhetoric and sym- 
bols  designed  to inspire the people,”  it draws on a heterogeneous coalition 
aimed  primarily  at the  working  class, but  including  and  led  by  significant 
sectors from the middle and upper strata, and, third, populism “has connoted 
a reformist set of policies tailored to promote development without explosive 
class conflict.” He notes that the programs “normally respond to the problems 
of underdevelopment by expanding state activism to incorporate the workers 
in a process of  accelerated industrialization through ameliorative redistribu- 
tive measures” (p. 2 18). 
Conniff (1982, p. 5) has argued that “populist programs frequently over- 
lapped with those of socialism.” We emphasize that the redistributive  objec- 
tive is the central part of the paradigm. Whether they are motivated by a strat- 
egy of  massive  social  reform is important  and  consequential,  but  it  is not 
central to our discussion. 
For us “economic populism” is an approach to economics that emphasizes 
growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and 
deficit finance, external constraints,  and the reaction  of economic agents to 
aggressive nonmarket  policies.2 The purpose in setting out this paradigm is 
not a righteous assertion of conservative economics, but rather a warning that 
populist policies do ultimately fail; and when they fail it is always at a fright- 
ening cost to the very groups that  were supposed to be favored.  A  central 
thesis we advance is that the macroeconomics of various experiences is very 
much the same, even if the politics differed greatly. 
The most important features of  the populist paradigm can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Initial conditions. -The  populist policymakers-and  the population  at 
large-are  deeply  dissatisfied  with  the  economy’s performance;  there  is a 
strong feeling that things can be better. Typically, the country has experienced 
very moderate growth, stagnation, or outright depression as a result of previ- 
ous  stabilization  attempts.  This  previous  stabilization  experience  often, 
though not necessarily always, has been implemented under an IMF program 
and has resulted in reduced growth and lower living standards. In addition, a 
highly uneven income distribution usually presents a serious political and eco- 
nomic problem,  providing the appeal for a radically different economic pro- 
gram. The preceding stabilization would generally have improved the budget 
and the external balance (through the accumulation of international reserves) 
sufficiently to provide  the room  for,  though perhaps  not  the wisdom  of,  a 
highly expansionary program. 
2. No constraints. -Policymakers  explicitly reject  the conservative  para- 
digm and ignore the existence of any type of constraints on macroeconomic 
policy. Idle capacity is seen as providing the leeway for expansion.  Existing 
international reserves and the ability to ration foreign exchange create addi- 
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tional room for expansive policies without the risk of  running into external 
constraints. The risks of deficit finance emphasized in traditional thinking are 
portrayed as exaggerated or altogether unfounded. According to populist pol- 
icymakers, expansion is not inflationary (if there is no devaluation) because 
spare capacity and decreasing long-run costs contain cost pressures and there 
is always room to squeeze profit margins by price controls. 
For example, the script for Peru’s populism, El Peru Heterodoxo: Un Mo- 
delo Economico (Carbonetto et al. 1987, p. 82) notes: “An examination of the 
Peruvian record reveals that periods of moderate inflation are associated with 
expansionary fiscal policies.  And  periods of  major inflation are associated 
with fiscal restraint. Thus, the record shows exactly the opposite of  what is 
predicted by a theory which explains inflation by fiscal deficits.” And: 
If  it were  necessary to  summarize in  two  words the  economic strategy 
adopted by  the government starting in August 1985 they are control (mean- 
ing control of prices and costs and recognizing that this could be done only 
temporarily for the first twelve months) and spend, transferring resources 
to the poorest so that they increase consumption and create a demand for 
increased output, thus “justifying” that idle capacity be put to use. 
It is necessary to spend, even at the cost of  a fiscal deficit, because, if 
this deficit transfers public resources to increased consumption of the poor- 
est they demand more goods and it  will bring about a reduction  in  unit 
costs, thus the deficit is not inflationary, on the contrary! 
3.  Policy prescriptions. -In  light of the initial conditions described above, 
the populist programs emphasize three elements: reactivation, redistribution 
of  income,  and restructuring of  the economy. The common thread here is 
“reactivation with redistribution.” The recommended policy is to actively use 
macroeconomic policy to redistribute income, typically by  large real-wage 
increases that are not to be passed on into higher prices.  However, even  if 
inflationary pressures do develop, the populist policymaker rejects devalua- 
tion because of a conviction that it reduces living standards and because it will 
have further inflationary impact without positively affecting the external sec- 
tor. The economy is to be restructured to save on foreign exchange and sup- 
port higher levels of real wages and higher growth. In Allende’s Chile, Vus- 
kovic (1973, p. 50) argued: 
The urgent need to achieve rapid recovery of the economy, and to extend 
the benefits to the mass of the working population, cannot be undertaken in 
isolation  from  the  structural  changes;  they  are  all  necessarily  inter- 
dependent. It is not possible to make deeper changes without broadening 
the Government’s political support, and economic reactivation and income 
redistribution will provide an impulse to these fundamental changes. 
In Garcia’s Peru, a strikingly similar program was articulated in the Plan Nu- 
cional de Desarrollo, 1989-90: 
The new economic policy seeks to pass from an economy of  conflict and 
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sible to make compatible  stability, growth, distribution,  and development 
in a context of national planning which finds concrete expression in dia- 
logue and social and economic agreement. We need to reconcile economic 
efficiency with social equity in a productive system which is fundamentally 
sustained by domestic resources. (Presidencia de la Republica 1986, p. 63). 
1.2  The Phases of Populist Economics 
Once in power, and armed with the above paradigm, populist policymakers 
rapidly move to implement ambitious economic programs aimed at redistrib- 
uting  income, generating  employment, and  accelerating  growth.  Although 
each historical populist episode exhibits some unique features, it is still pos- 
sible to distinguish four phases common to the vast majority of experiences  .3 
Phase 1.  -In  the first phase, the policymakers are fully vindicated in their 
diagnosis and prescription: growth of output, real wages, and employment are 
high, and the macroeconomic policies are nothing short of successful. Con- 
trols  assure that inflation  is not a problem,  and  shortages are alleviated by 
imports. The run-down of inventories and the availability of imports (financed 
by reserve decumulation  or suspension of external payments) accommodate 
the demand expansion with little impact on inflation. 
Phase 2.-The  economy runs into bottlenecks, partly as a result of a strong 
expansion  in demand  for domestic  goods, and partly  because of  a growing 
lack of foreign exchange. Whereas inventory decumulation was an essential 
feature of the first phase, the low levels of inventories and inventory building 
are now a source of problems. Price realignments and devaluation, exchange 
control, or protection become necessary. Inflation increases significantly, but 
wages keep up. The budget deficit worsens tremendously as a result of perva- 
sive subsidies on wage goods and foreign exchange. 
Bitar (1986, chap. 5)  portrays very clearly the Chilean government’s inabil- 
ity to control events, to shift from redistribution to accumulation: “It turned 
out to be very difficult to contain the forces unleashed in 1971. The sequential 
conception of redistribution followed by accumulation assumed that basic po- 
litical and social conduct could be altered and popular expectations changed 
virtually  instantaneously.  In the next few months [early 19721 it proved im- 
possible to apply this thinking with the facility that had been hoped for.” 
Phase 3.  -Pervasive  shortages, extreme acceleration of inflation, and an 
obvious foreign exchange gap lead to capital flight and demonetization of the 
economy. The budget deficit deteriorates violently because of a steep decline 
in  tax  collection  and  increasing  subsidy costs. The government attempts to 
stabilize by cutting subsidies and by a real depreciation. Real wages fall mas- 
sively, and policies become unstable. It becomes clear that the government is 
in a desperate situation. 
3. Sturzenegger (1990)  develops a dynamic intertemporal model that traces out the dynamics 
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Phase  4.  -Orthodox  stabilization takes  over  under  a new  government. 
More often than not, an IMF program will be enacted; and, when everything 
is said and done, the real wage will have declined massively, to a level signif- 
icantly lower than when the whole episode began. Moreover, that decline will 
be very persistent, because the politics and economics of the experience will 
have depressed investment and promoted capital flight. The extremity of real 
wage declines is due to a simple fact: capital is mobile across borders, but 
labor is not. Capitaltan flee from poor policies, labor is trapped. 
The ultimate dismantling is often accompanied by  major political change, 
including violent overthrow of  the government. The middle-class sanctions 
these developments because of the economic threat of populism. Rosenstein- 
Rodan (1974, p. 7) has captured this middle-class “legitimization” of the coup 
in the crass expression, “Salvador Allende died not because he was a socialist, 
but because he was an incompetent.” 
1.3  Policy Mistakes, History and Memory 
With the exception of Colombia-where  populist macroeconomic policies 
have been largely absent during the last four decades-the  episodes with pop- 
ulist economics in  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Nicaragua, 
analyzed in this book, have followed quite closely the four phases we identify 
above. Although the final outcome of  these experiments was not always the 
total collapse and destruction of the economy (as in Chile, Peru, and Nicara- 
gua, for example), in all cases there were disastrous effects for those groups 
who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of the policies. 
At the end of the road one cannot avoid wondering whether the mistakes of 
past populist regimes can be internalized by  policymakers, politicians, and 
the population at large and, thus, be avoided in the future. Quite clearly, the 
detailed case studies collected here suggest that, in general, there is very little 
capacity (or willingness) of  learning from other countries’ experiences. In- 
deed, one of the most striking regularities of these episodes is the insistence 
with which the engineers of the populist programs argue that their circum- 
stances are unique and thus immune from historical lessons from other na- 
tions. 
A slightly different question, however, is whether countries have an eco- 
nomic and political memory  that allows them to learn from their own  mis- 
takes. Recent developments in Chile, where the new democratic government 
that took power in March 1990 faced urgent and immediate pressures to im- 
prove the social conditions of the poor, provide some new light on this sub- 
ject. Both the writings of the economic team of the new Chilean government, 
as well as the economic program of the governing coalition-which  includes 
many  of  the parties in Allende’s Unidad Popular, suggest that some of  the 
more important lessons regarding the design of economic policy have indeed 
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repeatedly the need to maintain fiscal balance and to pursue redistributional 
goals through focussed microeconomic policies. 
The central question is whether populist policies are outright unsustainable, 
or whether there is a variant that, properly executed, can in fact succeed. We 
leave to further research the elaboration of the thesis that (short-term) expan- 
sionary policies can succeed provided they stay far clear of foreign exchange 
constraints, emphasize reactivation only for a brief initial period, and then 
shift to growth policies.  Most important for success, expansionary policies 
need to be aware of capacity constraints and for their financing must rely on 
an extremely orthodox fiscal policy and rigorous tax administration. 
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